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Joint Force Innovation Access and ATO Reform Act

SEC. ____. ACCELERATED ACCESS OF SMALL BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL SOFTWARE CAPABILITIES TO THE JOINT FORCE; REFORM OF AUTHORIZATION TO OPERATE AS A BARRIER TO ENTRY.

(a) Short Title. This section may be cited as the Joint Force Innovation Access and ATO Reform Act.

(b) Findings. Congress finds the following: (1) Authorization to Operate is an inherently governmental risk-acceptance decision and is not a commercially available credential that a small business or nontraditional concern can purchase on the open market. (2) American small businesses and other nontraditional innovators are a strategic source of software and artificial intelligence for the Joint Force, including agentic, neuromorphic, quantum-based, and advanced cryptographic capabilities. Treating a completed Authorization to Operate as a precondition to consideration, pilot, or award withholds the only process the Department controls and thereby keeps those capabilities from warfighters. (3) DevSecOps platforms are a strategic national-security imperative. The speed at which the Department can securely deliver and update software is a direct determinant of Joint Force capability. (4) Reciprocity required by section 1522 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 has not been implemented as a default across authorizing officials. (5) The first operational question asked of many covered concerns is whether the vendor already possesses an Authorization to Operate. That practice functions as a blocking mechanism, not a security control. (6) Providing a path to production, authorized hosting and a timely authorization decision, is a duty of the Department and of the mission owner who elects to use a covered capability. (7) Traditional, document-centric authorization is FTE-heavy. Manual package preparation, repetitive control assessment, and serial compliance authorizing-official reviews consume civilian and contractor labor that does not scale with software tempo. Data-centric agentic and automated review of inherited controls, evidence ingestion, and continuous monitoring can reduce that labor while improving the currency of risk data. (8) Savings from retiring duplicative manual authorization work should be captured and applied to mission-owner landing zones and to the authorization decisions those zones enable, not retained solely in central enterprise services. (9) Quantum-safe cryptography, including homomorphic encryption that permits computation on encrypted data, and neuromorphic and quantum-based computing, are emerging Joint Force capabilities that will be blocked if authorization practice assumes only conventional enterprise software.

(c) Definitions. In this section: (1) COVERED CONCERN means (A) a small business concern as defined in section 3 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632); (B) a nontraditional defense contractor as defined in section 3014 of title 10, United States Code; or (C) a concern performing a SBIR or STTR award of the Department, including Phase III. (2) COVERED CAPABILITY means software, a software-enabled system, a data platform, or an artificial intelligence system offered by a covered concern for operational use, experimentation, prototyping, or evaluation by the Department of War, including (A) an agentic artificial intelligence system; (B) neuromorphic engineered software or a neuromorphic engineered system; (C) quantum-based software or a quantum-based system, including quantum sensing, quantum computing, and quantum communications software; and (D) quantum-safe cryptographic software, including homomorphic encryption that permits computation on encrypted data without exposing plaintext to the host environment. (3) AUTHORIZATION TO OPERATE; ATO have the meaning given in Department policy implementing the Risk Management Framework or any successor construct, including the Cybersecurity Risk Management Construct. (4) AUTHORIZED LANDING ZONE means a Department-owned, mission-owner-operated, or Department-sponsored hosting, DevSecOps, or software-factory environment that holds a current authorization and can inherit security controls to a tenant workload. The term includes an experimentation environment at Impact Level 6 and in a special-access program, and an environment able to host a covered capability described in paragraph (2)(C) or (2)(D) where the mission requires it. (5) AUTHORIZATION TO EXPERIMENT; ATE means a time-bounded, mission-bounded, continuously monitored authorization sufficient to operate a covered capability on an authorized landing zone for experimentation, test, or limited operational use, without constituting a full system-of-record ATO issued to the vendor. (6) MISSION OWNER means the program executive officer, commanding officer, portfolio acquisition executive, or other official who solicits, evaluates, pilots, or fields a covered capability. (7) COMPLETE ONBOARDING PACKAGE means the artifacts listed in the checklist issued under subsection (f)(5). The checklist shall not exceed product-delta evidence (architecture and data-flow; inheritance matrix; configuration baseline; software bill of materials; logging and identity integration notes; and, for agentic, neuromorphic, or quantum-based capabilities, the overlay items in subsection (g)). It shall not require a vendor-owned system security plan for the landing zone. (8) SECRETARY means the Secretary of War.

(d) Prohibition on ATO as a Threshold or Source-Selection Factor. (1) IN GENERAL. Beginning 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, no official of the Department of War may (A) require a covered concern to possess an Authorization to Operate as a condition of submitting a proposal, receiving an Other Transaction, Commercial Solutions Opening award, SBIR or STTR Phase III award, procurement for experimental purposes, or a contract or order for a covered capability; (B) use possession or lack of an ATO as an evaluation factor, go/no-go criterion, or responsibility determination for a covered capability, except as provided in paragraph (2); (C) refuse to evaluate operational merit, or refuse to initiate landing-zone placement, solely because the vendor does not already possess an Authorization to Operate; or (D) reject, defer, or condition an award or placement solely because the covered concern has not identified funds for a vendor-owned ATO package. (2) EXCEPTION FOR PRODUCTION. Paragraph (1) does not require connection of a covered capability to a production network at Impact Level 6 or in a special-access environment. The exception in this paragraph does not relieve the Secretary of the duty in subsection (e) to provide an accredited experimentation landing zone at Impact Level 6 and for special-access experimentation. (3) ELECTION. A mission owner who issues a solicitation for a covered capability, accepts a proposal or pitch for evaluation, or funds a prototype or experiment of a covered capability has elected to evaluate that capability for purposes of subsection (e). (4) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. Nothing in this subsection lowers the cybersecurity obligations of the Department. Risk acceptance remains an inherently governmental function of an authorizing official.

(e) Path to Productuion is a Department and Mission-Owner Duty.

(1) A mission owner who has elected to evaluate, pilot, or field a covered capability shall furnish (A) an authorized landing zone at the applicable impact level; and (B) a timely authorization decision under subsection (f). (2) PREFERENCE. The mission owner shall use a mission-owner or military-department landing zone when one exists at the required impact level. A Department-wide or Service-wide enterprise platform shall be leveraged as a fallback when the mission owner lacks a suitable environment, not as a substitute for mission-owner responsibility. (3) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, acting through the Chief Information Officer and in coordination with the Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering, the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer, the Defense Innovation Unit, and the military department chief information officers, shall designate (A) fallback landing zones at Impact Levels 2, 4, and 5; and (B) an accredited experimentation landing zone at Impact Level 6 and an accredited experimentation path for special-access capabilities, for use when a mission owner has no suitable environment. (4) Each authorized landing zone shall inherit identity, logging, scanning, container hardening, and continuous monitoring; accept machine-readable artifacts; support the subsection (g) overlay; be capable, where the mission requires, of hosting quantum-safe and homomorphic-encryption workloads without forcing plaintext exposure as a condition of authorization; and shall not charge a vendor authorization fee for the security boundary. (5) A mission owner may not decline evaluation on the ground that only a central enterprise service can host or authorize the capability, or on the ground that the capability is neuromorphic, quantum-based, or uses homomorphic encryption. (f) Authorization to Experiment; Time Limits. (1) Upon receipt of a complete onboarding package, the responsible authorizing official shall issue an ATE or an authorization to use under the host-system ATO, or a written denial, not later than (A) 30 calendar days for Impact Level 2; (B) 45 calendar days for Impact Level 4; and (C) 60 calendar days for Impact Level 5. For an experimentation landing zone designated under subsection (e)(3)(B), the period shall be 90 calendar days. (2) The authorizing official may extend a deadline in paragraph (1) once, for not more than 15 calendar days, upon written notice to the mission owner and the Chief Information Officer stating the specific control gap still open. (3) An ATE shall run not less than 180 days, may be renewed, shall convert to continuous authorization upon published criteria, and shall be revoked immediately if continuous-monitoring thresholds are breached. (4) If no decision is issued when the period in paragraph (1), plus any extension under paragraph (2), has expired (A) the Chief Information Officer shall, within 10 calendar days, assign another authorizing official to decide the package and shall notify the mission owner and the congressional defense committees of the missed deadline, the residual open items, and the official assigned; (B) the assigned authorizing official shall issue an ATE, an authorization to use under the host-system ATO, or a written denial not later than 15 calendar days after assignment; and (C) silence, and the expiration of a deadline, shall not constitute an authorization. Risk acceptance remains the decision of an authorizing official. (5) Not later than 60 days after enactment, the Chief Information Officer shall publish the complete-onboarding-package checklist, including a short annex for neuromorphic, quantum-based, and homomorphic-encryption workloads. After publication, a package that contains each listed item is complete. Additional artifacts may be requested in parallel and shall not reset the clock in paragraph (1).

(g) Advanced Capability Overlay. Not later than 120 days after enactment, the Chief Information Officer, with the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer, shall publish an overlay for agentic, neuromorphic, and quantum-based covered capabilities, and for quantum-safe homomorphic encryption, limited to: model and tool inventory; data-provenance attestation; evaluation and red-team results; human approval gates for specified action classes; logging of prompts, tool calls, and outputs; rapid rollback; continuous evaluation; and, for homomorphic encryption, a statement of what remains encrypted in the landing zone and what, if anything, is decrypted. The overlay shall be assessed through pipeline automation and shall not require a vendor-owned ATO as a precondition to an ATE or host-system authorization to use.

(h) Mandatory Reciprocity and Continuous Authorization. (1) An authorizing official shall presume the adequacy of a peer assessment or authorization at the same or lower impact level for a similar purpose, consistent with section 1522 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, and shall issue an authorization to use rather than a new ATO unless a material architectural delta is documented that landing-zone conditions cannot mitigate. (2) Continuous authorization with automated monitoring is the default after initial ATE or host-system authorization to use for software that remains in the landing zone and within published change thresholds. (3) FedRAMP at the appropriate level is the baseline for Impact Level 2 and the starting assessment for Impact Levels 4 and 5; only documented Department-unique deltas shall be re-assessed.

(i) Cost Responsibility; Savings; Funding. (1) COST SPLIT. The Department pays for the landing zone, inherited controls, the authorizing-official decision, and boundary continuous monitoring. The mission owner who has elected under subsection (d)(3) identifies the funds for that path from accounts available to that mission owner, including amounts provided under this subsection. A covered concern pays only for product-delta evidence described in subsection (c)(7). (2) NO VENDOR ATO TAX. A covered concern shall not be required to fund a vendor-owned system-of-record ATO, a FedRAMP authorization, or an enterprise-service subscription as a condition of consideration, award, ATE, or host-system authorization to use. (3) AGENTIC TRANSITION OF MANUAL ATO LABOR. Not later than 180 days after enactment, the Chief Information Officer and the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer shall field, on not fewer than two authorized landing zones, automated or agentic assistance for evidence ingestion, control-inheritance mapping, vulnerability correlation, and draft risk recommendations. An authorizing official remains solely responsible for risk acceptance. Manual, document-centric reassessment of inherited landing-zone controls is prohibited except for a documented material delta. (4) SAVINGS DETERMINATION. Not later than 270 days after enactment, and annually for five years, the Secretary shall determine the civilian, military, and contractor FTE and dollar cost of authorization activities for covered capabilities, compare that cost to the prior three-year baseline for equivalent packages, and identify savings attributable to inheritance, reciprocity, continuous monitoring, and agentic assistance under paragraph (3). (5) APPLICATION OF SAVINGS. Savings identified under paragraph (4) shall be available to mission owners for landing-zone operations and authorization decisions under this section. Such savings shall not be used to expand a central enterprise service except at the written request of a mission owner. (6) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS AND TRANSFER. (A) There is authorized to be appropriated $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2027 to carry out this section, of which not less than $28,000,000 shall be available only to military departments and mission owners for landing-zone capacity and authorizing-official support, and not more than $12,000,000 may be used for Department-wide fallback landing zones, including the Impact Level 6 and special-access experimentation path required by subsection (e)(3)(B), and the agentic assistance required by paragraph (3). (B) Of amounts otherwise authorized for Department information-technology, Risk Management Framework support, cybersecurity compliance support, and related contractor support for fiscal year 2027, the Secretary may transfer not more than $40,000,000 to carry out this section. A transfer under this subparagraph is the preferred bill-payer. New budget authority under subparagraph (A) shall be reduced dollar-for-dollar by amounts transferred under this subparagraph. (C) The Secretary shall notify the congressional defense committees not later than 15 days after a transfer under subparagraph (B). (7) The Secretary shall not impose ATO-package preparation costs on a covered concern as a condition of an ATE or host-system authorization to use.

(j) Contracting Alignment. (1) Solicitations for covered capabilities issued after the effective date of subsection (d) shall state that an ATO is not a submission requirement and shall identify the landing zone or the process to designate one. (2) Other Transaction agreements, Commercial Solutions Openings, and experimental procurement shall include standard ATE or host-system authorization-to-use terms. (3) The Defense Innovation Unit and military department innovation organizations shall maintain a single intake for landing-zone placement.

(k) Transparency. (1) The Chief Information Officer shall maintain a CAC-restricted directory of authorizing officials, impact-level authorities, landing-zone points of contact, and median time-to-decision. (2) The Secretary shall publish a quarterly department-level dashboard of time-to-decision, reciprocity refusals, and clock resets. Individual authorizing-official personnel ratings are not required by this section. (3) Lack of organic cybersecurity staff of a covered concern is not a basis to refuse an ATE or host-system authorization to use if the concern accepts inherited controls and continuous monitoring.

(l) Reports. (1) Not later than 270 days after enactment, and annually for five years, the Secretary shall report to the congressional defense committees (A) onboardings, ATEs and host-system authorizations issued or denied, and conversions to continuous authorization, by impact level and military department, including the Impact Level 6 and special-access experimentation path, and including neuromorphic, quantum-based, and homomorphic-encryption workloads; (B) median and 90th-percentile time from complete package to first Joint Force use; (C) subsection (d) violations and corrective action; (D) reciprocity refusals and documented deltas; (E) FTE and dollar baseline, savings under subsection (i)(4), transfers under subsection (i)(6), and the split between mission-owner and central-enterprise obligation; and (F) landing-zone utilization and remaining capacity, including the experimentation landing zone designated under subsection (e)(3)(B). (2) Not later than 18 months after enactment, the Comptroller General shall assess compliance and whether authorization practice or cost-shifting remains a barrier to entry for covered concerns, and shall validate the savings methodology in subsection (i)(4). (m) Rules of Construction. (1) This section does not require connection of a covered capability to a weapons-system safety-critical control path without applicable safety and airworthiness processes. (2) This section does not supersede restrictions on foreign ownership, control, or influence, or on covered sources. (3) Sections 4021, 4022, and 4023 of title 10, United States Code, and procurement for experimental purposes, shall be construed consistently with this section. (4) Nothing in this section requires the Department to field a quantum computer. It requires a path to experiment with a covered capability when a mission owner elects to evaluate one offered by a covered concern. (n) Effective Dates. Subsection (d) takes effect 90 days after enactment. Subsections (e) through (k) take effect upon implementing guidance, but not later than 180 days after enactment..

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